Abstract
More specifically however, the party spectrum in the Republic of Moldova has been divided across geopolitical boundaries, with left-wing structures typically opting for rapprochement with the East, and right-wing forces adopting a pro-Western stance (Boţan, 2016) . This split -initially between proponents of integration in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), nowadays of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), on the one hand, and those advocating closer ties with the European Union (EU) on the other hand -also reflects different views regarding the cornerstones of the Moldovan political system as a whole, with only the latter being (fully) committed to the model of liberal democracy, whereas the former's set of values include statism, authoritarianism and egalitarianism (Protsyk, Bucătaru and Volentir, 2008, p. 91) . These inclinations appeal to a significant part of the electorate in the Republic of Moldova, where migration in the past years has depleted the "ranks" of the urban, working-age, better-educated (potential) middle-class, i.e. what could be the core voters of the center-right. It should also be mentioned that this constellation resulted from an initial divide between forces advocating for the re-establishment of the Soviet state and those in favor of (re-)unification with Romania (Pisica, 2013, p. 312) , which subsequently complementarily adopted a pro-European discourse as well. the aftermath of what became publicly known as "the theft of the billion" ("furtul miliardului"), when ca. 1 billion US dollars (representing no less than 12 percent of the Moldovan GDP) disappeared from three Moldovan banks and which generated a profound crisis of trust in the pro-European parties in government. Since this article represents work in progress only -given also the recentness of the developments it touches upon -it does not have the intention to exhaustively cover the topic concerned, but rather to offer an impulse for more profound research in this regard. Also, the present paper does not seek to analyze the broader political ramifications of the on-going political crisis in the Republic of Moldova.
The relevance of understanding the evolution of the pro-European parties in the Republic of Moldova is not limited to the scope of political party analysis. In societies engaged in transformation processes, parties "are the vital point of connection between society and government" and since integration -whether in Eastern or Western structuresrepresents, at least to a certain extent, a raison d'être of transformation as such, it is the role of parties to not only "filter demands and organize them into more or less coherent policy" (Dellebrant, 1993, p. 148) , but also to convey to -a more or less disoriented populationwherein the destination of transformation lies. Moreover, in the case of the Moldovan political system, the role of parties has been more important than in other post-Soviet states, like Russia or the Ukraine (Büscher, 2004, p. 536) , especially due to the fact that initially the 1994 Constitution provided for a semi-presidential system (with a stronger role for Parliament compared to other CIS countries), which was replaced in 2000 by a parliamentary system, thus further enhancing the position of political parties (Büscher and Avram, 2012, p. 294) . A further contributing factor in this respect is the election of the Moldovan parliament based upon the proportional representation of parties ever since 1994 (Protsyk, Bucătaru and Volentir, 2008, pp. 43-44) , which is to be replaced by a mixed system in a controversial move of the current government, voted upon by Parliament in July 2017 (Sieg, 2017) . The proportional system adopted in 1994 "equipped party leaders with the ability to control the majority" (Webster, 2008, p. 232) .
Nevertheless, while the systemic prerequisites for a functioning multiparty system have been in place for over two decades, the Moldovan party landscape has not yet reached institutional maturity. The proportional voting system strengthened the role of the party chairmen, but the fact that subsequently new forces emerged centered upon the figure of the founding leader hindered the institutional consolidation of the parties themselves (Bucătaru, On- (Pisica, 2013, p. 314) .
A further problematic issue is related to the fact that, until 2016, political parties in the Republic of Moldova received no subsidies from the state budget and -given the dire social and economic situation -could also not raise significant funding through membership fees, thus having to rely on donations from private persons or entities. In fact, a recent study 35 (Boţan, 2015) . Notably however, in the capital Chișinău -where voting behavior in local elections is more party-oriented than in rural areas -the PPEM became the second-strongest party (after PSRM), with a score of 11.58 percent of the votes for the Municipal Council, whereas the PLDM "had to swallow (…) a bitter pill" in seeing its score fall from over 14 percent (in 2011) to only 3.52 percent (Irmer, 2015, p. 3) . Thus, Leancă's move to create his own political movement generated a new element of fragmentation of the center-right
Moldovan party landscape, which initially affected only the PLDM (Boţan, 2015) . 
40, 42).
The public success of the PPEM was limited, however, confirming the fluidity of the Moldovan party spectrum, especially on the center-right. After its initial success as "a proEuropean alternative to the compromised political parties", experts warned that an eventual PPEM rapprochement towards the ruling coalition risked bringing about its downfall (e.g. Boţan, 2015) . Precisely this was to happen, with Leancă's party signing a partnership agreement with the governmental coalition in July 2016. By October 2016, the voter intention rate of the PPEM had plummeted to 1.7 percent, with public trust at just 11.6 percent 9 Private ("Chatham House rules") discussions the author attended. A special note should also be made regarding the Liberal Party (PL), which had been able to slightly enhance its electoral score at the local elections in summer 2015 (from 9.67 to 12.62 percent), thus initially avoiding the decline of the PLDM, not least thanks to the "[geo-
]political" vote for the mayor of Chişinău, where the incumbent Dorin Chirtoacă (and nephew of PL chairman Mihai Ghimpu) had managed to maintain his position, thanks to the polarization of the electorate in the capital between him and the PSRM pro-Russian candidate Zinaida Greceanîi (Boţan, 2015) . Chirtoacă had always been more popular than his uncle and the PL had been dependent on his image as well as on Ghimpu's and in the context of the PL's tactical refusal to initially be part of the governmental coalition in the first half of 2015, the trust ratings of Chirtoacă, Ghimpu and the PL did not suffer from the image blows Publice, 2016a, pp. 37, 44, 47) . Chirtoacă, also in decline at 17.4 percent, was still much better placed than both Ghimpu and the PL.
The decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova in March 2016
to reinstate the direct election of the President had thus occurred at a moment when the center-right spectrum of the Moldovan had suffered its most significant wave of fragmentation for several years. The established center-right parties PLDM and PL were in decline, the PPEM had already reached its inflection point and PAS and PPDA had established themselves as relevant pro-European political forces. Given the already personalized nature of the Moldovan party landscape, it appears natural that a direct presidential vote would exacerbate this trait, as presidentialism encourages individual responsibility, since "presidential executive authority resides with an individual who is elected to the position for a fixed period of time" (Kesteloot, De Vries and and De Landtsheer, 2008, pp. 78-79) .
In an (ultimately unsuccessful) effort to prevent an electoral win by Igor Dodon, three center-right parties -PLDM, PAS and PPDA -committed to field a common candidate in a move supported by the European People's Party, of which the PLDM is an observermember. 10 From the very outset, the PLDM decided not to nominate any potential candidate, whereas both PAS and PPDA proposed their respective leaders, Maia Sandu and Andrei
Năstase, who both initially entered the presidential race. Despite tensions between the two, Năstase agreed to withdraw from the campaign (and actively supported Maia Sandu) after a poll commissioned by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung revealed that voter intent was higher for Sandu (14.3 percent) than Năstase (13 percent). 11 Moreover, the study had shown that in case of Sandu's withdrawal, only 21.9 percent would vote for Năstase, whereas if the latter would pull out, Maia Sandu could garner 26.54 percent -and thus be better placed in the run-off vote against Dodon, whose entry into the second round had been certain from the very outset.
Maia Sandu's first-round result of 38.71 percent was also facilitated by the withdrawal of While Maia Sandu and Andrei Năstase had been running "neck and neck" in the months before the presidential vote, the fact that ultimately the pro-European party spectrum rallied around the former (Leancă also explicitly endorsed her in the second round) created a new layer of personalization, centered around her. This also impacted upon the ratings of her party -but especially on those of potential competitors in the center-right segment of the political landscape. In April 2017, PAS had a positive trust rating of 38 percent, whereas the PPDA only scored 25 percent. These figures largely correspond to the personal ratings of the two party leaders, with Sandu at 38 percent and Năstase at 28. More significantly though is that when it comes to voter intent, PAS now stands at 24.8 percent and the PPDA at only 4.6 percent (Institutul de Politici Publice, 2017, pp. 47, 50, 55) . Thus, it appears that Sandu's electoral performance has convinced voters that her party may be a more reliable (or "safer") option -having seen how the PAS chairwoman can handle an electoral campaign -even if they may also trust the other major center-right political force.
In what would seem to be a negative effect of personalization, both the PPEM and the PL now have historically low polling ratings, with voter intent standing at 1.3 and 0.8 percent respectively. The dismal scores of their leaders in the presidential election will have certainly played a role. Even the positive trust ratings of the two parties are quite low, at 12 and 7 percent. Significantly, the PLDM's open support for Maia Sandu during the electoral campaign -which also meant that there was no active promotion of the image of the party's current leader, Viorel Cibotaru -has pushed its ratings even lower. Positive trust lay at 6 percent in April of this year, whereas voter intent was almost irrelevant at 0.2 percent.
The present paper has shown that the Moldovan pro-European, center-right party spectrum has retained three characteristic traits -fragmentation, fluidity and personalization -with the most recent reconfiguration wave proving that the structural weaknesses of the party system have not fundamentally changed since independence. The established parties PLDM and PL declined alongside their founding leaders, whereas the newly-formed PPEM initially benefitted from the positive image of its chairman, before he also lost the faith of Moreover, it should be mentioned that while the left was also shaken by the demise of the PCRM -the electorate of which was largely taken over by the Socialists -it is the proWestern spectrum of the Moldovan party landscape that is still in desperate need of consolidation. After Igor Dodon's election as president, the Socialists dominance in the proRussian spectrum has become uncontested, with their voter intent standing at 33.6 percent.
While the electoral chances of a common electoral block comprising at least the three parties which supported the idea of a single pro-European candidate in the presidential vote would need to be tested in an opinion poll, the chances of the center-right parties running separately would almost certainly be lower. Should this step not be taken, there appears to be no guarantee that after 2018 a new wave of reconfiguration of the center-right does not yet again shake up Moldovan politics.
